Beyond the IRB: An Ethical Toolkit for Long-Term Disaster Research

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This article argues for expanding the ethical frame of concern in disaster research from the early phases of site access to longer-term issues that may arise in the field. Drawing on ethical theory, these arguments are developed in five sections. First, we identify the philosophical roots of ethical principles used in social science research. Second, we discuss how ethical concerns span the entire lifecycle of disaster-related research projects but are not fully addressed in the initial protocols for gaining Institutional Research Board (IRB) approval. Third, we introduce the idea of the philosophically-informed “ethical toolkit,” established to help build awareness of moral obligations and to provide ways to navigate ethical confusion to reach sound research decisions. Specifically, we use the work of W. D. Ross to introduce a template of moral considerations that include fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence. We suggest that in the absence of a clear framework that researchers can use to think through ethical dilemmas as they arise, Ross’ pluralist approach to ethical problem solving offers flexibility and clarity, and, at the same time, leaves space to apply our own understanding of the context in question. Fourth, we draw on six examples from our respective research studies conducted following Hurricane Katrina. Using these examples, we discuss how, in retrospect, we can apply Ross’ moral considerations to the ethical issues raised including: (1) shifting vulnerability among disaster survivors, (2) the expectations of participants, and (3) concerns about
reciprocity in long-term fieldwork. Fifth, we consider how the ethical toolkit we are proposing may improve the quality of research and research relationships.

**Keywords:** Ethics; Ethical Dilemmas, Ethical Toolkit, Institutional Review Board (IRB), Disaster, Hurricane Katrina, Disaster Recovery, Vulnerability, Ethnographic Methods, Qualitative Research, Long-Term Research.

**Research Ethics and the Field of Disaster Studies**

There are many resources that offer insight about ethical standards of research involving human beings—the Belmont Report, journals specializing in research ethics\(^1\), and a large variety of articles that discuss research ethics and codes of ethics across various disciplines\(^2\). Journals focusing on trauma, crisis, or loss are more frequently publishing articles about research ethics.

Yet, in the field of disaster studies where researchers must anticipate potentially high levels of participant vulnerability, the ethics literature is surprisingly thin. The first major book published on methods of disaster research offers no systematic discussion of ethical issues (Stallings 2002). Another more recent volume, *Methods for Disaster Mental Health Research* (Norris et al. 2006), includes a chapter on disaster research ethics. However, the scope is limited and the chapter authors attend only to the development of post-disaster research protocols that “require the concern of investigators and review committees in order to assure that participants in research are adequately protected” (Fleischman et al. 2006: 79).

Similarly, the articles available on disaster research ethics predominantly concentrate on ethical decision-making at the research proposal stage (Dennis et al. 2006) or in the early phases of research involving such issues as sampling, participant access, informed consent, confidentiality, and subject compensation (Ausbrooks et al. 2009; Chung et al. 2008; Galea et al. 2008; Knack et al. 2006; McClaine et al. 2007). A special section in the *Journal of Traumatic Stress* (vol. 17, no. 5, 2004) specifically addresses the ethics of disaster research, although the articles focus primarily on issues such as the decision-making capacity of survivors to offer informed consent and the appropriate balance between research risks and benefits.

Disaster scholars are often under pressure to collect urgent, perishable data from people who have been suddenly impacted by tragedy. Yet, the need to move quickly following an event does not remove researchers from the normal IRB approval process\(^3\). Human subjects protocols have codified ethical concerns of research with disaster survivors in familiar ways, requiring researchers to address questions such as how they will: (1) gain access to disaster affected populations and/or relevant disaster response organizations, (2) deal with recruiting and interviewing survivors during initial contact, (3) obtain informed consent, and (4) protect the vulnerable? These institutional standards
reinforce the recognition among researchers that ethical caution is important in early encounters with survivors.

Once a proposal is approved, IRBs require investigators to complete annual progress reports and to report any deviations from their IRB protocols. Typically, however, institutions do not require researchers to inform review boards about ethical dilemmas that arise over the longer-term. We define ethical dilemmas as situations that raise moral or ethical concerns where there is no obvious, clear-cut resolution. Often, these concerns emerge from the competing interests of people involved in the research; sometimes they come about because of misunderstandings or from promises that can no longer be met. A wide variety of circumstances can produce such ethical uncertainty.

IRB protocol paperwork focuses almost entirely on the initial stages of research. That is, ethical considerations about disaster research occupy a foregrounded position during proposal formation and the early phase of on-site research, but concerns about ethical choices that emerge following Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval remain outside an active frame of discussion for many researchers as well as institutions.

Overview

Our central interest in this article is to identify a set of common ethical dilemmas in disaster research and to propose a way to handle the ethical confusion and the research predicaments these situations can produce. Our own fieldwork experiences and those of other disaster researchers before us demonstrate how common it is for significant ethical dilemmas to emerge without warning in the course of conducting interviews and ethnographic research (c.f. Guillemin & Gillam 2004).

In this article, we argue two key points: first, that there are reasons to expand the ethical frame of concern in disaster research, and second, that awareness and resolution of ethical issues that arise after IRB approval can be made easier with a philosophically-informed “ethical toolkit.” We draw on ethical theory and examples from our own fieldwork to develop these arguments, laid out in five sections identified below. In the final section, we offer a set of suggestions aimed at researchers interested in the long-term study of disaster-affected populations:

Part 1. Identify the philosophical roots of the guiding ethical principles used in research today;

Part 2. Discuss how ethical concerns span the entire lifecycle of a research project but are not fully addressed in the protocols for gaining IRB approval;

Part 3. Offer a construct—that of the ethical toolkit—that can help us build awareness of our moral obligations and give us ways to clarify the ethical factors at play and reach a sound decision while in the field;
Part 4. Demonstrate how some of the ethical dilemmas we faced in conducting research in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina could have been addressed using this conceptual toolkit;

Part 5. Consider how an ethical toolkit may improve the overall quality of research and research relationships.

Soon after Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 29, 2005, causing catastrophic destruction along the U.S. Gulf Coast, we were awarded a National Science Foundation grant to conduct ethnographic research with families affected by Katrina. We pursued distinct projects with different families in different geographic areas, but with the common goal of understanding how these individuals and collective family units experienced loss and managed recovery. Katherine Browne’s project involved research with a large, 155-person African-American kin network. It resulted in the completion of the documentary film, Still Waiting: Life after Katrina (Browne & Martin 2007). After the film, Browne continued working with the family featured in the film for five more years to understand the fullest possible cascade of difficulties and opportunities associated with recovery. Lori Peek initiated two post-Katrina studies: the first project focused on the resettlement experiences of displaced families in Colorado; the second entailed research on the long-term recovery trajectories of children in Louisiana. For the sake of our discussion here, we have identified a subset of ethical questions—addressed in Part 4—that we confronted in our separate research studies at different points in time in the years after Katrina.

Part 1. The Evolution of Ethics in Human Research:
Philosophical Roots and Applications

The application of ethical guidelines to research protocols has evolved largely as a result of “ethical failures” of one kind or another (Fluehr-Lobban 2003; Whiteford & Trotter 2008). An ethical failure exists “any time a researcher coerces individuals to participate in the research, lies or deceives in the informed consent process, hides or misrepresents project-related risks, puts a community at risk, or conducts research that will not benefit the people involved in the research” (Whiteford & Trotter 2008: 12).

The earliest ethical code for research with human subjects was established in the biomedical and natural sciences, initiated on the heels of grossly inhumane and exploitive research conducted by Nazis on captives during World War II. But Nazis were not the first or the only ones to conduct unthinkably cruel research. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States, leaders in the eugenics movement advocated for the extermination of so-called “undesirable” population groups and forcibly sterilized scores of Native American and African American men and women, persons with disabilities, low-income individuals, and incarcerated persons. From 1932-1972, the infamous Tuskegee research study exploited low-income black men with
syphilis without their knowledge and resulted in doctors withholding access to medical treatments that were then available.

War and race- and class-based discrimination aside, ethical breaches of all kinds continue to generate correctives that become the basis for revised versions of professional codes of ethics. In some disciplines like sociology and anthropology, where the earliest professional codes of ethics were adopted in 1970 and 1971, respectively, these codes have been updated and expanded regularly, typically inspired by a new ethical failure or by controversial research activities that play out in public arenas.

In the wake of increasing awareness of the ethical breaches in academia and at the highest levels of government, a federal-level commission undertook an extensive four-year study of ethical issues concerning human subjects research. In 1978, the commission issued what became known as the Belmont Report, outlining “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research.” According to the U.S. Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP), the Belmont Report represents “a milestone in Federal responsibility, leadership, and commitment.” The official website also notes that the Belmont Report “explains the unifying ethical principles that form the basis for the… regulations that incorporate its recommendations” and that it “continues as an essential reference for Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).”

Since the 1970s, universities that receive Federal funding have regulated the research of their faculty and students through requiring a set of human subjects protocols that draw on the Belmont Report. These protocols attempt to ensure that at each institution, each research study involving humans is in compliance with the ethical principles of the Belmont Report. To this end, the protocols identify a three-part ethical mandate required of researchers involving the ideals of beneficence, autonomy, and justice. The protocol submitted is then evaluated by a university-appointed IRB to verify compliance with these principles.

Interestingly, the principles that human subjects protocols reference from the Belmont Report draw on two distinct, and in fact, fundamentally opposed philosophical traditions—“utilitarian” ethics and “Kantian” ethics. Each of these ethical traditions involves countless variations. However, our interest here is not to present esoteric philosophical debates, but rather to locate a “normative” moral construct with broad value for guiding us in moments of ethical need. Thus, in this article, we provide only a brief overview of the basic tenets of these foundational ideas before proposing the value of a different kind of construct.

On the one hand, utilitarian ethical codes are focused on the outcomes of one’s actions, (and thus, are also often referred to as “consequentialist” moral theories). In 1776, Jeremy Bentham authored the classic articulation of the principle of utility as the guiding force of ethical action. The son of Bentham’s collaborator, John Stuart Mill, later elaborated on Bentham’s ideas. Mill (1863) argued that a moral act is one that results in “good” (e.g., happiness, pleasure) and, in general, actions that produce the most benefit
for the most people are regarded as the best choices. Today there are many disputes about
the nature of the “good.” But however the good is defined, utilitarians regard the
“morally right” action as the one that produces the most “good” or the least “bad” or least
“pain.”

Immanuel Kant argued a very different moral philosophy in three treatises written
from 1785-1797. Kant believed that ethical action arises from a sense of duty to universal
moral law, and that when an act aligns with this law, the “intrinsic” rightness of the act
would be assured. Thus, in contrast to determining the rightness of an act based on the
value of its consequences, deontological theories like Kantianism assert that “the right”
moral choice comes instead from the character of our actions. To evaluate the moral
character of a given act, Kant developed a fundamental principle of morality known as
the “Categorical Imperative.” By reasoning through the exercises laid out in the
formulations of the Categorical Imperative, it is possible to determine whether a given act
is morally imperative, morally acceptable, or morally unacceptable.

For our purposes, we are interested in the portion of Kant’s moral theory that has
been integrated into the logic of the Belmont Report, and thereby, into the ethical
guidelines assumed by the IRB protocol. The two portions of Kant’s Categorical
Imperative that relate to the Belmont Report include the “Humanity Formula” and the
“Autonomy Formula.” The Humanity Formula relates to how we treat other human
beings—our duty to treat people as ends in and of themselves and not solely as a means
to some end. The Autonomy Formula requires us to respect the autonomy of others’
rational will—in effect, we are obligated to respect the dignity and worth of other human
beings by recognizing their own innate capacity and right to reason for themselves.
According to Kant’s work, all of the formulations in the Categorical Imperative were
understood to be expressions of a single moral law.

In short, then, utilitarian theories hold that what is right is determined by the good
that comes from an act; Kantian theory holds that the right act is a product of duty and
reasoned moral good, not outcomes. Unifying aspects of Kantian and utilitarian ethics in
the Belmont Report allowed IRBs to attempt to cover all possible ethical bases.
Institutional protocols require us, for example, to act as good Kantians by demonstrating
how we have the moral law of respecting the rights of individuals by protecting the
autonomy and capacity for self-determination of study participants. We are also required
to act as faithful utilitarians by demonstrating how the “benefits” of our research
outweigh the “risks.” Interestingly, the outcome-oriented philosophy resonates strongly
with many values we hold dear in American society. Even the logic of capitalist
economies can be described as following a utilitarian ethical rationale—“it may not be
perfect, but it delivers the most good to the most people.”
Part 2. Identifying the “Ethical” in Post-Disaster Research with Humans

Most researchers know from experience that it is not always possible to prioritize ethical concerns equally. The attempt to make an ethical and moral choice becomes difficult when a single universal principle like “do the most good” competes with a different universal principle such as “respect the rights of another individual.” The former principle is based on outcomes and the latter on a reasoned understanding of one’s sense of moral duty. Each principle belongs to its own approach to ethical reasoning, neither allowing for the weighing of different factors that may play into a situation. Single-principle systems of logic are inherently hierarchical and thus preclude the accommodation of worthy, competing demands. The right answer to an ethical problem in these systems of thought is knowable, based on a reasoned set of steps. It is not hard to see how trying to uphold one’s loyalty to the genuine demands of both of these ethical systems for decision-making can lead us straight into contradictions. Let’s take an example. Suppose someone has confided a secret that might benefit others or even save lives if exposed. And let’s say that to resolve our dilemma, we choose the Kantian path of honoring that person’s rights to autonomy and self-determination, thus sacrificing the lives of those we might have been able to save. If on the other hand, we choose to honor the utilitarian goal of creating the greatest good for the greatest number, we could easily violate the Kantian premise of respecting the autonomy of individuals who have done the most for us.

To bring this example even closer to the disaster research field we are concerned with here, consider the following: Imagine that one survivor in your study informed you that she had identified a loophole in a post-disaster aid system that allowed her to access thousands of extra dollars in life-sustaining disaster relief aid. She had done nothing illegal; she simply discovered how to use the system to maximize the benefits she receives. She told you about this in the confidence of an interview and asked that you not share with the other members of her community (and participants in your study) for fear that it would affect her standing in the community or her ability to attain future aid. Again, do you act as a good Kantian by respecting the rights and autonomy of this individual? Or do you act as a utilitarian and share the information with your other research participants, in hopes that they will reap the same maximum recovery benefits?

In our experience, ethical dilemmas, moral conflicts, and quandaries such as these regularly occur in post-disaster environments. Yet, discussions about how to make sound ethical choices rarely appear in the disaster literature. What explains this neglect? We believe there are at least four potential reasons: (1) ethical conundrums often arise in later phases of qualitative research, well after the completion of the most common type of post-disaster research—cross-sectional surveys conducted in the immediate aftermath of disaster, (Norris et al. 2002; Phillips 2002); (2) ethical dilemmas that accompany longer-term research are typically not addressed by IRBs and thus are more likely to remain
“invisible” or “hidden”; (3) there is no clear institutional framework to remind researchers of ethical issues or conflicts or to help them think through their moral responsibilities during these later phases of long-term ethnographic research; and (4) publication outlets place word limits on journal articles, thus limiting the space available for disclosing and reflecting upon ethical issues.

From our perspective as researchers engaged in long-term disaster study, the range of possible ethical encounters and problems that are covered in an IRB protocol represent a limited set of concerns. Yet because these delimited concerns are well understood and explicitly reviewed by university IRBs, it is easy to imagine that the universe of ethical problems one will confront is covered by the protocol process. Our experience, which suggests otherwise, provided the impetus for this article.

The stakes for recognizing hidden ethical landmines in long-term research are growing. We define ethical landmines as the potentially explosive moments in which a poor ethical choice may produce detrimental effects on relationships with participants and on the research project as a whole. Today, there are increasing numbers of disaster scholars and ethnographers who are studying long-term trajectories of individual- and community-level recovery and resilience. For these researchers, it is important to become aware of the inevitability of encountering such ethical landmines that may not have been anticipated in an IRB review. New disaster researchers are joining the field in record numbers today, in part because the number of disasters in the United States continues to rise, drawing more attention to this important realm of study. In addition, many scholars become disaster researchers after their home communities are struck by disaster. For novice researchers and even veteran researchers who are new to disaster study, awareness of ethical landmines and access to an ethical toolkit could provide a useful way to prepare for unanticipated bumps in the work of post-disaster investigation.

As we demonstrate below with our own post-Katrina research examples, the ethical dilemmas that arise over longer-term fieldwork are not necessarily later-in-time versions of the same concerns that early-in-time researchers must attend to. Instead, ethical challenges are often different in kind, precisely because they are different in time. Indeed, consider the range of ethical questions disaster researchers may confront when they attempt to document the process of recovery among survivors over many months or even many years:

- Whether to pay participants when you discover other researchers are doing so and it is getting harder to get the interviews you need without monetary compensation?
- How to capture critical emotional “hot spots” in interviews without exploiting someone’s emotional vulnerability?
- How to build rapport and get in-depth data from people you learn are personal enemies, in a dominant/subordinate relationship to each other, or on opposite sides of an important issue in the community?
• How to respond to hostility of some in the community toward the research we want to conduct?
• Whether to become an advocate for the people you interview and under what circumstances?
• How to notice the shifts in people’s physical or emotional vulnerability over time and decide what should be done about these kinds of changes?
• Whether to risk confidentiality in order to get help for someone in need?
• How to respond to participant requests (or demands) for money, services, time, or labor when you feel you have given all you can?

Ethical issues can confront us at any moment during the full span of our studies: these issues do not end until the data we generate have been analyzed, interpreted, and disseminated. Yet human subjects protocols create a formal “passage” researchers must travel through. This passage assures us implicitly that on the other end of the IRB approval is validation that we are good to go, finished with the job of responding to issues we may only vaguely even recognize as ethical—issues about whether we are following good practice by the way we have set up our research. Our first argument thus suggests that the nature of long-term research, and especially research with people impacted by disaster, requires us to become alert to ethical problems as they arise, well beyond the IRB approval of our protocol.

**Part 3. A Flexible but Rigorous Ethical Framework: An Ethical Toolkit**

Some ethical frameworks offer the comfort of answers. If we decided to rely on either Kantian or utilitarian ideas, either of these systems of thought would assert predetermined priorities, irrespective of the situation at hand. When a problem arises, if we have chosen to follow Kant’s Categorical Imperative as our guiding framework, we would ask ourselves whether we are acting on our duty toward the moral absolutes (such as fulfilling our promises, paying our debts, telling the truth). There is no such thing as “second-order” obligations or a circumstance that would rightfully compel us to violate these singular moral duties. Utilitarian ethical theory engages us in a different decision procedure. Using this framework to consider an ethical problem, we would need to ask ourselves whether the action we are contemplating would provide the most good of all the actions available to us. Whichever action does so, that is the correct action to follow. Both Kantian and utilitarian approaches engage us in clear paths for identifying the right answer.

What makes these theories amenable to the comfort and straightforward appeal of decision maps is the very reason that we view them as inadequate—their logic rises from a single, root truth and systems with different root truths cannot be reconciled. Thus,
despite the satisfaction these frameworks allow in terms of their internal consistency, they admit no exceptions. The only way to achieve such consistency is by flattening all the variables and all the relationships that are at play into extraneous concerns. In the process, we argue, such solutions require us to dismiss altogether the value of considering a complicated moral and ethical situation from different perspectives.

Short of following a Kantian or utilitarian system, researchers may achieve ethical clarity in other ways. Before we introduce our argument for a “pluralist” approach to ethical decision-making, one that does not offer pre-determined solutions for the problems we encounter, it is worthwhile to review two of the most common approaches that researchers adopt today. One kind of ethical clarity results from an expectation that the ethical questions of our research will be identified in advance by an IRB. By completing the formal paperwork and processes that are commonly perceived as “hoops” we must jump through in order to get our studies approved, it is understandable that some researchers may, consciously or unconsciously, simply relax their ethical radar after securing these institutional blessings. When the IRB is perceived as ethics itself, the stamp of approval may allow us to discount if not altogether dismiss later ethical challenges in our research. We might call this default assumption an “ethics-as-IRB” position. Of course, we have no data suggesting most or even many researchers subscribe to an “ethics-as-IRB” approach to their own work. But our discussions with colleagues suggest that at the very least, some do.

A different form of ethical clarity arises from a participant-centered approach to research, a kind of ethics-as-everything position that involves deliberate research design emphasizing shared research decisions with participants. Both feminist versions of research ethics (such as “ethics of care”), and the increasingly popular (and feminist-informed) participatory action research (PAR) model engage participants in full collaborations to define the research question, shape the instruments of data collection, analyze the data, help interpret the results, and co-author publications with the researchers (Hewitt 2007; Murphy & Dingwall 2001; Olesen 2000). This participant centered approach might be called the “ethics-as-all” approach to research. In practice, this increasingly important way of achieving ethical clarity may pre-empt the ethical landmines that more traditional research approaches cannot avoid because of the tight integration between the researcher and the researched community.

In effect, then, a continuum of assumptions about the nature of ethical concerns presents on one end a position in which these concerns are virtually confined to the human subjects protocol, the “ethics-as-IRB” position; at the other end, ethical concerns lead the decision about what and who to research, putting participants fully at the center of the project in the “ethics-as-all” approach. However much an ethics-as-IRB approach may appear to offer moral clarity, or however desirable an ethics-as-all approach may be in leveling the power differences between researcher and participant, most disaster researchers likely fall somewhere between these two perspectives. Indeed, heightened
awareness of our moral responsibilities to participants poses perhaps the greatest burden to those of us who do not situate ourselves with either the “ethics-as-IRB” or the “ethics-as-all” approach to research.

We refer to the big middle portion of this ethical continuum as “ethics-in-practice.” For those of us occupying this space, the nature of ethical concerns involves dealing with what comes up in the course of our research. In effect, this middle position leaves us with unresolved ethical problems that are likely to arise. The toolkit we propose in this article offers no pre-determined answer in advance of the question. There is no decision tree that one could learn in advance in order to follow during a moment of crisis in order to arrive at the correct answer. In our view, this is precisely where a strong, yet flexible, framework becomes important. We believe that our sensitivity and effectiveness as disaster researchers can improve by integrating an ethical toolkit into our own ethics-in-practice approach. Such a toolkit is conceptual in nature involving new attention and awareness that draws on a basic set of moral concepts.

Two points distinguish our notion of an ethical toolkit: First, we understand the toolkit as a living part of ourselves, not an external kit we tote along to the field like a piece of luggage. The toolkit we are identifying is more like a muscle group, vital to our well-being, but if we do not exercise this part of ourselves, the muscles will not develop.

A second point, extending from the first, is that, like building strength in any part of our own anatomy, once we begin to use the toolkit and pay more attention to its role in our professional work, it acquires more conceptual strength. In this sense, there are no two identical toolkits—we each build our own based on our own experiences. Developing a toolkit that can aid us in a difficult situation depends on some preparation—specifically, becoming aware of the moral factors that may impinge on any ethical situation. As we become more experienced, we learn to allow the situation itself to guide us about those factors that take precedence given the set of circumstances and people involved. Our comfort with evaluating moral considerations in a given situation also increases the robustness and power of the toolkit.

For us, the very premise of an ethical toolkit emerges from the idea that there often is not one right decision in the field, but instead a chance to make a better decision that might cause less harm and do more good while fulfilling our obligations to ourselves and others. Any researcher who wants to become more aware of ethical issues and more comfortable with ethical choices can benefit from using it. The toolkit itself nurtures critical reflection and reinforces a better understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of our decision making process.

Some philosophers have attempted to navigate a more satisfying and less absolute path to ethical thinking than Kant’s “right” sense of duty and Mills’ “good” outcomes. One of the most compelling approaches comes from W.D. Ross, a British scholar who translated Aristotle’s work and whose ethical framework is attracting new attention today. Ross wrote The Right and the Good as an attempt to develop a set of moral
obligations that correspond to everyday life and human relations (Ross 2002 [1930]). Unlike the single-principle formulas that underlie both the Kantian idea of duty and the utilitarian idea built around good outcomes, Ross generated a “pluralist” list of morally right considerations. Ross’ moral factors co-exist, but not in hierarchical relation to each other: each factor is itself irreducible. His pluralist approach is premised on the wide variety of relations we nurture as human beings. There are no general “rules” or “codes” that can provide a “decision procedure” to tell us exactly how to assess what is ethically right. Instead, Ross indicates that it is up to us to consider the salience of each factor using educated insight and a sense of context about the situation at hand so that we arrive at a right decision about our competing ethical obligations.\(^{18}\)

For Ross, the key moral considerations involved in any decision include the following: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence (see Figure 1). Yet, none of these concepts carries an absolute obligation.\(^{19}\) This pluralist conception is, in fact, the power of Ross’ approach—the recognition that in a given situation, there may be multiple ethical concerns that cannot all be satisfied in a single decision. When different ethical concerns compete for primacy, we face an ethical dilemma. Our decision for how to act, Ross argues, requires careful consideration of the relative importance of each ethical concern. Based on our deliberate work to weigh the importance of the key factors that are at play in a given case, the ultimate right and good action can become apparent.

**Figure 1. Key Moral Considerations Identified by W.D. Ross**

![Diagram](image-url)
The ethical principles that shape the Belmont Report remain useful and important guides for initiating research in a post-disaster context, primarily because both IRBs and researchers are well-acquainted with the types of ethical dilemmas that are likely to appear during one’s early entry into disaster contexts. However, familiarity with these kinds of issues effectively obviates the need for understanding the ethical framework on which appropriate actions are based. Moreover, the guidelines can be somewhat abstract and, since they derive from wholly distinct ethical formulations, their conflated assumptions can produce confusion. We thus present Ross’ work as a more comprehensive and flexible set of ideas that can help us think through the ethical dilemmas that accompany us in the course of our long-term studies of disaster survivors.

Part 4. The Ethical Toolkit in Action: Applications to Our Own Dilemmas

In this section, we offer examples of ethical issues that emerged in our post-Katrina fieldwork. Although unique to our particular research projects, we have talked to many other disaster researchers who have encountered similar sorts of challenges in their own projects. As such, we hope that these examples will help illuminate three general categories of concern that researchers involved in such long-term studies of disaster survivors are likely to encounter. The categories are by no means exhaustive, but they do capture a wide variety of fieldwork contexts in which ethical challenges may appear.

First, there is the category of shifting vulnerability. Scholars have documented that certain populations regularly suffer the most severe consequences from disaster—groups such as women, children, elderly, the poor, persons with disabilities, and racial and ethnic minorities (see Phillips et al. 2010; Thomas et al. 2013). This work also acknowledges that vulnerability is not innate, nor does it represent a static state. Instead, vulnerability is dynamic and it may build in a cumulative manner when post-disaster needs are not met. People—including those who do not ordinarily belong to a vulnerable “class”—may enter and exit vulnerable states many times over the course of their recovery from a disaster. Our job as researchers is to recognize a participant’s vulnerability whenever it presents itself. However, because we are not necessarily trained to watch for indicators of variations in vulnerability, such recognition is not built into our explicit awareness. Deciding what to do about a person’s vulnerability may be even more difficult, from an ethical standpoint, than recognizing that vulnerability in the first place (McClain et al. 2007).

Second there is the category of expectations. Participants hold various expectations about the research we are doing, about us as people, and about our relationships to them. These expectations are often unintentionally nurtured, yet they can arise naturally from our desire to be friendly, to get the best data, and, in some cases, to act as advocates for those we interview. Expectations organize all kinds of relationships based on formal and
informal promises and patterns of behavior that seem like reliable indicators of our interest and our commitments. As researchers, we often do not realize that the nature of our attention to participants may create serious expectations of us. Lacking such awareness, we can easily fail to deliver and thus disappoint or even cause harm to our research participants. Indeed, when researchers violate the expectations of the survivors we depend on to teach us about their struggles and their experiences, we can lose their trust, and at that point, a participant may choose to share less with us, withdraw from the study, or worst of all, be unintentionally emotionally harmed.

Third, there is the category of reciprocity, the idea of giving back to those who share their stories with us and help us learn and develop a better understanding of the struggles involved in recovering from catastrophe. Marcel Mauss argued that the practice of gift giving follows a three-beat rhythm: give, receive, and give back. Where there is a missing beat, the relationship can be threatened and may not survive depending on the stakes and circumstances. Some researchers avoid the complexity of calculating how to give back in kind by giving a fixed amount of money to each participant. This strategy allows the researcher (who has profited from the participant’s knowledge) to cancel out a debt by completing the cycle of reciprocity in a market-oriented way. Researchers who conduct successive interviews and/or ethnographic investigation over the long-term are more likely to develop relationships with those they study. For them, the third beat, the “giving back” can be ethically challenging because there are no rules and it can be difficult to know how much is enough (in order to be recognized as a true “give back”) and how much is too much (and thus fosters inappropriate expectations). By definition, long-term ethnographic studies also lead to more time spent with participants and more in-depth observations of their unfolding lives and needs. More intimate knowledge of participants can both clarify and complicate our efforts to give back. For instance, a researcher may discover that a family does not need a $25 gift card, they need school uniforms for their children, or a kitchen appliance, or even an automobile to get to and from work. What can we do when we realize that what study participants need is not what we are offering or perhaps even something that we can give? Questions about compensating some more than others also raises issues of perceived inequity. But equal giving to all participants can create its own ethical landmines. Gift giving is nearly always fraught with doubt, even among insiders in the same cultural system (Mauss 1990 [1925]). When researchers operate across cultural borders, the unwritten codes about gift giving are even more opaque and problematic.

Below, we explore each of these three categories by offering a pair of ethical dilemmas from our own post-Katrina fieldwork. The discussion of our examples will follow a three-part organization: (1) the context surrounding the issue and what we chose to do; (2) a look back at how Ross’ framework operating as our ethical toolkit could have helped us think about the best solution; and (3) what we would do differently given the same situation now. In each case we indicate the point in time the ethical issue arose in
order to emphasize the importance of moving “beyond the IRB” and remembering that many of the most serious ethical challenges may occur months or even years after a human subjects protocol has been approved. At this point in the article, we shift from using “we” to using “I” in the text because we are offering examples from each of our independent research projects.

Category 1: Shifting Vulnerability

Browne’s ethical dilemma: Protecting the emotional state of a woman who overheard an interview with her spouse.

Timeframe in the process of recovery: Four years after the disaster.

1.1.a. Context and experience:

In June 2009, nearly four years after Hurricane Katrina, I (Browne) conducted an interview with two men in their 50s, Potchie and Charles. I had prepared a short survey about the relative ease or difficulty of accomplishing various tasks related to getting their lives back in order. The survey would give useful close-ended information and allow me entrée for asking open-ended questions about how these men had experienced the recovery process. Potchie was an important member of the large black family I was studying—self-employed with his own trucking company and highly involved in the annual family reunions that he helped re-inaugurate the prior summer. Charles was a man who had married into the family more than 20 years ago. In the years since Katrina, he had struggled to find steady work, but had devoted his free time to becoming a minister.

Potchie and his wife, Darlene, had just completed renovations to their Katrina-damaged home—work that required gutting the walls back to the studs. Like everyone else in the family, they had lived in a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailer for far too long. Potchie had been quick to volunteer his house for the interview site, and on entering the lovely new interior, I could understand his pride and desire to welcome people into their new home. I arrived with a big box of fried chicken and plenty of sides for everyone. Darlene greeted me, asked what she could get me to drink, and set the food on the counter, saying we would eat later. I had thought that the food would offer a pleasant opener to warm up with small talk before getting underway with the interview. I certainly hoped the interview would last more than an hour, and if it did, dinner might be very late. But I didn’t want to presume anything, so made no attempt to interfere with Darlene’s plan.

After taking a seat at the table with Potchie and Charles, we talked about the kind of restoration work the home had required. With Darlene standing close by in the kitchen, I casually asked everyone how they felt about Katrina at this point. Was it still front and center in their lives? Was it largely over? Darlene jumped in, saying, “You know, it’s not
the same with everybody being all the different places and stuff…” Potchie barely let her finish, “I’m over it, I’m over it. Yeah, it’s behind me now.” Charles agreed. Darlene came back, “But when I pass and see how things are not back, then it’s like I don’t wanna be here. I wanna go away.”

“What kind of things did you notice?” I asked Darlene. “Just looking at the houses, the stores. Nothing’s back. The supermarkets. You have to go so far to get things.” Charles pressed her when he asked about going to the new Winn Dixie grocery store that had opened recently nearby. “They don’t have the good stuff,” she responded. “What’s the good stuff?” he asked. “Like the real, real fresh stuff. It’s just not [the same]…” And so went the exchange. Darlene was outnumbered by her husband and Charles. They both made it emphatically clear that the inconveniences, while real, were just part of the recovery process. Stores were coming back and this was home, period.

“You are willing to leave?” I asked. Darlene responded emphatically: “Yes, I am. I am willing to leave.” And she further elaborated on the ease of life in Houston where her sister lived and how every necessary amenity was so close. Potchie quickly chimed in: “I am NOT going anywhere else, and I think if she left for a year, she’d realize this is the only place to live.” At that point, I realized I had inadvertently entered a family dispute that was still raw, even if it had been “settled,” at least at that moment. There was a gender power imbalance on display, one that I had probably reinforced in an uncomfortable way for Darlene.

1.1.b. A backward glance with the aid of Ross’ framework:

In looking back at this situation with the help of Ross’ framework, it is clear that there were competing moral considerations at play. It had been nearly four years since the storm, but Darlene remained emotionally distraught about the quality of life she had expected and was not experiencing. Reflecting on the situation, I realized I did not acknowledge or manage Darlene’s vulnerability as well as I might have, precisely because I had allowed myself to operate from a sense of mission about the interview that did not include her. For one thing, I felt sincere gratitude towards Potchie who had gone out of his way to include me in the family events he helped plan, to connect me to other family members, to remain accessible to talk with me (even when he was terribly busy), and to offer his home as a comfortable place where we could all meet. The evening was not only colored by my strong sense of gratitude, it also involved my recognition that men’s voices were just beginning to assume more space and weight in my research than before, and I wanted this trend to continue.

During the film project that ended in 2007, it had been very difficult to locate men willing to be interviewed (see Browne 2008). But once the film was finished and broadcast, men gradually began to open up to me. Maybe their willingness emerged after the camera left, or maybe they had just come to trust my genuine interest in their
struggles and triumphs related to recovery since they were clearly ongoing. Still, even four years after the storm, I had to work hard to get men together for an interview. That’s why I was so excited about that night—it was like research gold to me.

But I had not anticipated the presence of Potchie’s wife who stayed close during the early part of the interview. Nor did I anticipate their strong conflict about being back in their former home community after Katrina. I certainly did not imagine that my loyalties to the men could have brought me uncomfortably close to discounting Darlene’s feelings, much less add to her distress. I owed Darlene the fundamental consideration that Ross and other ethical theorists find agreement about—“do no harm.” But I was not thinking about Darlene as carefully as I was thinking about the other research participants in that setting. When Potchie and Charles both declared their desire to live in their home community and nowhere else, I validated their perspective, one that supported everything I had witnessed and heard over the years. “This really is a special place,” I said. My support for the men’s views did not visibly rattle Darlene, but she may well have felt ganged up on as if her perspective was somehow less important. In response, she began ticking off all the ways the place was indeed “special”—how everyone feels safe, how they know and greet one another, how they offer food, and so forth. But from that acknowledgement, she had hoped to recapture the floor to make her real point about the problems with life here: “And that’s what I like about it here, but…” Then Potchie interjected: “She’s willing to leave because she don’t know what it is to miss home. I’m not movin’.” His statement had an air of finality, and after that, Darlene left the room.

I was aware of her abrupt departure, but at the time, I simply considered the problem one of gender and power relations. Potchie was exercising his role as head of household, not something I wanted to interfere with. Much later in the interview, after we had worked through the survey and the interview and he had elaborated many details about the recovery process, I came to see that even Potchie (without explicitly saying so) did not actually believe Katrina was over. His continuing emotional and financial struggles became quite clear and revealed his own vulnerability, despite his insistence at the outset of the evening that Katrina was completely behind him.

1.1.c. A forward glance at what I would do differently now:

Familiarity with a framework of moral concerns like Ross’ can help us stay alert to how we conduct our everyday relations with others. Perhaps the most important lesson in retrospect involved my need to better recognize human vulnerability. Though it may appear to be invisible, it rests just below the surface of ordinary interaction. In this case, four years after Katrina was not long enough for many people to have recaptured their sense of balance and well-being. Just because someone’s home is habitable again, does not attest to the end of the profound difficulties of starting over, a reality outsiders rarely
comprehend. Thus, it is useful to remember how a heightened ethical awareness can help us recognize the potency of such encounters for the people being interviewed.

In the future, Ross’ ethical framework would help me, and others, recognize obligations to more peripheral members of research projects. These individuals can be impacted by our words and actions, and we owe it to them to consider, at the very least, how we can avoid doing them harm. Darlene’s statements were an emotional plea for a different future than the one that her husband had decided for the family. I had done well by acting in accordance with my gratitude to Potchie, but a more robust ethical awareness could have helped me see that, given Darlene’s subordinate position and her dissenting view, I also needed to be careful with her feelings (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Moral Factors in Browne's Vulnerability Example 1.1**

Response without ethical tools

- Beneficence
- Fidelity
- Self-Improvement
- Gratitude
- Non-Maleficence
- Justice

Better response with ethical toolkit

- Beneficence
- Fidelity
- Self-Improvement
- Reparation
- Non-Maleficence
- Gratitude
- Justice

As a feminist who expects other women as well as men to treat me fairly, how could I have both honored Darlene’s position and also avoided interfering with the family system of decision-making? I might have said something like: “I’m sure this must be a terribly hard situation for a family to figure out.” Ross makes clear that even when one moral consideration rises to the top in a given situation, as gratitude did in this one, other moral factors may also be at play (see Figure 2). Ross’ framework compels scholars to recognize that, to the extent possible, we must attend to every moral concern that weights a situation.

**Category 1: Shifting Vulnerability**

**Peek’s ethical dilemma:** Continuing versus ending an emotionally charged interview.

**Timeframe in process of recovery:** Seven weeks after the disaster.
1.2.a. Context and experience:

In mid-October 2005, Megan Underhill, a first-year graduate student at the time, and I (Peek) arrived at the home of Samantha, an African American single mother from New Orleans. Seven weeks had now passed since Katrina. Samantha and her five children had been air lifted out of the flooded city by emergency responders and taken to Denver via airplane. Although we had spoken to Samantha on the telephone when we were arranging our meeting, the first time we met her and her children was the day we arrived at her newly acquired home in Denver for the interview.

She invited us in, offered us a drink of water, and asked us to sit at the kitchen table. Before we could even turn on our digital recorder, she began sharing her Katrina evacuation story. For the next 90 minutes, Samantha spoke with almost no prompting. She described the horrible experience of waking up and seeing water rising in her home; the stress of waiting with her children for days for relief and rescue from the flooded city of New Orleans; the difficulty in keeping her family together and safe as they made their way to the Superdome; and the sheer terror she felt when military personnel aimed their assault weapons at two of her teenage sons while they awaited rescue.

The only time that Samantha paused during the interview was when she became too overwhelmed to continue. Her emotional expression fluctuated between utter despair, anger, and a sort of stoic acceptance of the “inevitability” of the disaster. When Samantha started to cry during the interview, there was an awkward silence. Should we hug her? Tell her it is okay? Or maintain the emotional distance that some social scientists recommend (see Weiss 1994)? In the end, we just listened and said “I’m sorry, I’m so, so sorry,” over and over again.

During the interview, Samantha’s five children wandered in and out of the room. I was hyper-aware of their presence, and particularly concerned that they might be emotionally upset by watching their mother cry and by hearing her recount the traumatic evacuation experience that their family went through. Samantha described each moment of the evacuation, and the tremendous life threat that they all felt, in vivid and often horrifying detail. She sobbed as she recounted the fact that she as certain her youngest son was going to be shot by armed military personnel; all the while, her youngest daughter looked on with alarm and sadness.

After Samantha finished telling her evacuation story, it was clear that we were all emotionally exhausted: She from describing the unfolding disaster, and Underhill and I from listening to the raw details of human suffering. In the moment, we were not sure how to proceed. We had just spent one-and-a-half hours gathering one of the most descriptive and heart wrenching evacuation stories we had yet to collect. But there was still much more we wanted to learn from this participant—we had not yet even scratched the surface of her pre-Katrina circumstances, her resettlement experience thus far in Denver, or the status of her children’s health and well-being. These were topics that we...
were both interested in for our own research studies; we wanted and needed more data beyond the evacuation story.

Despite the fact that Samantha was clearly tired, we pressed on with the interview by moving down the questions on the guide we were following. We were able to gather some additional information, although it soon became apparent that Samantha was done talking for the day. She had shared all that she could, and her answers became shorter and shorter. She started to redirect our questions by saying things like “You should ask the kids about that. George, come over here and tell these ladies about your school.” Finally, after about 20 minutes of this, we realized that we needed to stop the interview.

1.2.b. A backward glance with the aid of Ross’ framework:

Underhill and I were operating from a moral position of “beneficence.” We were conscious of our belief that we were “doing good,” in that we were focused on gathering the stories of Katrina survivors as soon as possible after the disaster. There is a long history in disaster research of emphasizing the need to collect valuable information that would otherwise be lost if not captured in the short time frame following the disaster (Michaels 2003). Accordingly, we felt it was imperative that we collect this so-called “perishable data,” so that we would have the most detailed baseline information available that would then allow us to understand how the resettlement process would unfold for displaced persons in Colorado.

Our view that we were doing good, at least from a scholarly standpoint, served to outweigh other moral considerations that we should have more carefully thought about both before and during the interview. Specifically, by continuing the interview, even after Samantha grew visibly weary and started to withdraw, we violated Ross’ tenets of non-maleficence and of fidelity. We may have “done harm” to Samantha by continuing to press on with our questions, even after she was clearly finished sharing. And, in terms of fidelity, we did not keep the promise we had extended to her over the telephone when arranging the interview—the promise that she could “end the interview at any time” and that she “did not have to answer all the questions.”

1.2.c. A forward glance at what I would do differently now:

In my quest to gather the data so soon after Katrina, I did not fully consider how emotionally charged some of the interchanges would be and how complicated navigating the interview space would be as a result. Does this mean that I should not have even engaged in the research in the first place? Or should I have waited for more time to have passed following Katrina, in the hope that survivors would be in a more emotionally and physically stable condition?
These are difficult questions, as there are well-documented reasons that researchers can and should enter the field soon after disaster. Moreover, with Samantha and so many other Katrina survivors, it was clear that they genuinely did want to talk. They wanted to tell their “evacuation stories.” And, at the end of the interviews, when I would ask participants what they thought of being in the study, to a person they all agreed that it was “important” and that they “wanted others to know” about their experiences.

Perhaps the more important question to ask, then, is when is the right time to stop an interview? The IRB assumes that participants will tell researchers when they do not want to answer a question or when they want to end an interview. But the on-the-ground dynamic is always more complicated, in part because it is shaped by power differences between the researcher and the interviewee. Samantha did not verbally assert that she wanted to end the interview, but everything about her body language signaled to us that she was too tired and drained to continue. Good methods training might have suggested that the interview should have been stopped, but again, in that moment, it was difficult to decide when and how to cut off the interview, especially as Samantha continued to share so many details in a manner where she barely even paused to take a breath. The ethical toolkit would have helped me identify all the factors that were at stake, and realizing these, I would have acted more decisively to invite Samantha to take the control she deserved.

**Figure 3. Moral Factors in Peek's Vulnerability Example 1.2**

So what would I do differently now, armed with an ethical toolkit and Ross’ framework much more clearly in mind? First and foremost, I would have been more aware of the ethical limits of assuming that attentive listening is acting in good faith, in accordance with the beneficence attributed to such story-sharing in the literature. In fact,
the toolkit makes clear that other moral considerations were definitely in play—both the concern of doing no harm (non-maleficence) and that of fidelity to those for whom we have made promises (see Figure 3).

From Samantha’s perspective, these latter two factors were undoubtedly as important as any potential good achieved by providing her a forum to tell her story. Knowing this, we would have offered to end the interview as soon as Samantha began to show signs of fatigue. Rather than pressing on with the questions, I should have stopped to ask Samantha how she wanted to proceed. Did she want to stop talking altogether? Did she want to take a break for a while and then continue? Did she want to schedule a follow-up interview? Forfeiting control of the interview situation in this sort of way would have helped me to keep my promise to Samantha, that she could end the interview at any time, and would have worked better to ensure that no harm had been done as a result of Samantha’s over-sharing or simple exhaustion associated with the interview process.

Category 2: Fulfilling Expectations and Promises

Browne’s ethical dilemma: Whose expectations/interests do we honor when there is a conflict?

Timeframe in the process of recovery: Eight months after the disaster.

2.1.a. Context and experience:

Connie had left Louisiana some 20 years before Katrina to go to Dallas with her new husband. It was a good thing, too, since their home and contacts in Texas gave her large extended bayou family somewhere to go to ride out the storm. At least 155 relatives from Connie’s St. Bernard Parish family showed up at her doorstep in advance of the storm, seeking her assistance and shelter. During the weeks following the unexpected horror of Katrina, Connie was thrust into a central role within her kin group. She never hesitated to assume this role, and month after month, she continued to recruit a remarkable bounty of help for her stranded relatives.

But once people began returning to their beloved bayou in early 2006, Connie felt angered about the situation they were returning to—a profoundly racist parish where there were no black-owned businesses and virtually no black parish employees; where the schools had been consolidated so that black children and youth had to attend schools in the distant white areas of the parish. These were indignities Connie wanted to fix. So she devised a plan to return to the parish and make a formal offer of her time and services to the parish president whom she had known since childhood. She was ready to commit months of her life to helping improve the racial conditions in the parish. The disaster just might have wedged open a new crack in the wall, she thought, one that could bring
awareness and new opportunities to blacks in this overwhelmingly white-dominated parish.

Connie had been instrumental in making our entire research and film project possible, securing the permissions from family members in the first place, and making sure that information was available on what was happening generally in those first few months of dislocation. She had been a major character in the documentary film I (Browne) was producing with filmmaker colleague Ginny Martin. It was natural to want to capture her inspired effort to bring positive change back to the place she still considered home.

We chose not to worry about the lack of interest in Connie’s mission among her kin. It seemed understandable enough—everyone’s homes had been devastated by the storm, so the enormity of work ahead was all anyone could think about. For Connie’s relatives who had returned to their ruined homes in St. Bernard Parish, “turning things around for black people” would have to wait. After some consideration, I asked Connie if she would be willing to be filmed during her conversation with the parish president. It might help break open the silence about race issues that we hoped would find a voice in its own way in its own time. Perhaps, this was that time.

2.1.b. A backward glance with the aid of Ross’ framework:

We filmed Connie’s interview with the parish president without a single member of Connie’s family present. It was then I realized that perhaps I had overlooked a dynamic that needed more attention. Ultimately, Ross’ framework helped me make sense of my confusion (see Figure 4). By filming the interview, I realized, Martin and I gave Connie’s mission credibility, and honored a particular obligation to her, a moral factor Ross calls “fidelity” to those to whom researchers have made a promise, whether explicit or implicit. But in the process, we had risked something arguably more important: the political capital of all the other participants residing in the parish. Validating Connie’s way of attempting to bring about change and creating a “scene” with the film equipment and lights may have effectively cost resident family members their own opportunity to press claims for more urgent needs, like getting FEMA trailers for those just returning.

Recognizing the moral territory Ross makes clear, I realized I had gotten caught between Connie and her relatives without imagining the damage that could be done. That her interview took place with none of her kin there to support her position clarified the fact that Connie was no longer central to the network we had been following. In fact, she was widely regarded by others as an “outsider.” And her outsider style of negotiating race relations head-on conflicted with the ethic of her relatives who were steeped in a racial system of nuance and accommodation. It was not merely that her relatives were too busy to show their support for Connie’s effort to change things for their benefit; it was that Connie’s way of calling for change had nothing to do with theirs. She had been gone
from Louisiana too long and had assimilated to a more adversarial style of racial politics that would not work locally. The family knew it. I missed it.

With a retrospective look at the situation using Ross’ framework, it was easy to see where things went wrong. The moral consideration he called “fidelity” had driven my researcher instincts to follow Connie. In a sense, this was not wrong, but it also was not necessarily the best reflection of a strong ethical awareness. As Ross’ framework makes clear, there are often multiple ethical considerations that play into a single situation. Martin and I failed to consider the fullest set of ethical factors that might be involved in this situation before we made a judgment about which factor was most important. The consideration we had overlooked was non-maleficence; the “do no harm” consideration trumped fidelity in this case. But as upcoming examples will demonstrate, with an ethical toolkit built on Ross’ ideas, “do no harm” is not always the clear priority of a moral choice (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4. Moral Factors in Browne's Expectations Example 2.1**

2.1.c. *A forward glance at what I would do differently now:*

Awareness of the ethical possibility of doing harm in this situation might have saved us from the ethical compromise that occurred. Connie’s conversation with the parish president could have just as easily taken place off camera in the president’s office, taking it out of the high-profile, public intensity that we had contributed to without realizing the potential cost of our action. By not filming this exchange, we would have stayed out of the way of any family members who might have decided to ask for special consideration from the parish president whom they all knew as well.
The lesson about Connie’s outsider helped me to make a methodological adjustment in our filming: from that point forward, we dramatically scaled back our work with Connie in order to focus on the family members that had been directly impacted by the hurricane. At the same time, we could (and did) make good on our desire to demonstrate our “fidelity” to Connie by showing interest in her effort and by honoring her place in the film through our editing choices and our promotional materials. We featured Connie with two other women on the cover of the DVD, and we premiered the film in Dallas as well as New Orleans so that Connie’s role would be publicly acknowledged among her friends.

Category 2: Fulfilling Expectations and Promises

Peek’s ethical dilemma: Do we continue to fulfill expectations when there has been a miscommunication regarding the promise?

Timeframe in process of recovery: Two years after the disaster.

2.2.a. Context and experience:

One of the biggest differences between Browne’s research and my own is that she studied a large, closely connected extended family, while I (Peek) conducted interviews with displaced parents and children in individual households. In Colorado, the evacuee families I included in my research did not know one another before or, for the most part, after the storm. Thus, although a relatively large number of Katrina evacuees relocated to Denver (6,500 people by some counts), finding these individuals proved difficult. There were no publicly available lists of Katrina survivors and disaster aid workers were understandably protective of their clients and were typically unwilling or legally unable to share their contact information.

In the end, I tried a number of different approaches to find families to interview: attending Katrina-related meetings and events, using social networking Internet sites, distributing flyers, and spending numerous hours “hanging out” at the main disaster aid distribution center in Denver in hopes of meeting potential participants. These efforts yielded some interviews that then “snowballed” into additional interviews. But because Katrina survivors in Denver were largely disconnected from one another and because there were no formally-organized efforts to help them develop ties, locating new participants proved extremely difficult, frustrating, and time consuming.

Then, in the summer of 2007, nearly two years after Katrina, I interviewed Mekana, who at the time was 18 years old. She, her little sister, and their mother had relocated to Colorado before the storm, in 2005. Mekana finished her last two years of high school in Denver, where she met a number of other displaced teens from New Orleans who we enrolled in the same school as her after the storm. I was thrilled to find a Katrina survivor
with connections to other dislocated families. As soon as the interview ended, I asked Mekana if she was still in contact with these “Katrina kids,” as she fondly referred to them. When she nodded affirmatively and told me she knew of “at least 10 kids still in Denver with their families,” I recognized the opportunity to begin an active snowball sample of youth and their families in Denver.

At the time of the interview, Mekana was still living at home with her mother, but she had recently graduated high school and was now struggling to find work. It occurred to me that I could “help” Mekana by offering her a modest stipend to assist me with my project. She would introduce me to the families and would travel with me to subsequent interviews. In exchange, I would pay her $50 for each family that agreed to be interviewed and that we ultimately visited together. This seemed like a win-win situation: Mekana would earn some much needed cash while also having an opportunity to reconnect with her friends; I would obtain additional interviews and have the chance to work with a Katrina survivor in the process. Moreover, because Mekana and I are different ages and of different racial identities, I thought her presence might help with my credibility and trustworthiness as she could “vouch” for me, a white woman researcher who wanted to hear their stories.

Our arrangement seemed to be working out well. Mekana was eager to be involved in the project—she told me she was “excited” to have the chance to hear other stories about Katrina—and she admitted she was in “desperate need” of money. The first family we visited was absolutely great—the mother and father both agreed to be interviewed, as did their two children.

After completing the four interviews, all of which were rich in content, Mekana and I got into my car so I could drive her home to her mother’s apartment. It was during this short trip that I realized there had been a miscommunication. Mekana assumed that I was getting ready to pay her $200 ($50 for each interview), and she was excitedly telling me that she had several more interviews with families lined up for the following week. I could feel a small knot forming in my stomach. How could I respond? By now, the grant funds I had were all spent, so I was going to be paying out of pocket for these interviews. I did not want to risk alienating Mekana, but I was not sure how to handle the situation.

2.2.b. A backward glance with the aid of Ross’ framework:

My offer to pay Mekana to assist with the interviews in Denver emerged from, first, my own need to identify a larger sample of evacuee households in the area and, second, from my genuine desire to “do good” and to express my gratitude for her assistance with the project. Beneficence and gratitude are two of the fundamental duties that Ross identifies as making “right acts right.”

Where I ran into trouble with this situation, though, was when it became apparent that Mekana had a particular expectation (that I would be paying her $50 per individual
interview) while I had an entirely different expectation (that I would be paying her $50 per family). Regardless of the amount expended, I still would have been showing gratitude and doing good—Mekana was an unemployed teenager and basically broke, and any amount of money would have helped her. But if I only offered her $50 per family, as I had expected to do, Mekana would have perceived that I was breaking a promise to her. In Ross’ language, I would have violated the duty of fidelity. I recognize this now and in fact, I did resolve the communication gap by paying Mekana the amount that she thought I owed her. However, the resolution was not entirely satisfying since I did not explicitly recognize then that fulfilling Mekana’s expectations of me were more important than anything else. At the time, I simply knew that I was not willing to risk the relationship I had built with her—and the contacts she could offer me. In the end, we stopped at an ATM machine, I withdrew extra cash from my checking account, and I paid her for each individual interview and all the subsequent ones that she helped me to arrange.

2.2.c. A forward glance at what I would do differently now:

In the end, everything worked out for the best with Mekana. She helped me locate ten additional displaced families, and I was able to conduct dozens more interviews because of her. I was able to attain a more diverse sample and better data (her presence really did make a positive difference during the interviews, as the teenagers seemed immediately more comfortable and willing to talk when Mekana was there). Mekana earned a good deal of extra cash and gained invaluable research experience that she later listed on her resume as she applied for jobs. Throughout this process, she and I became friends and we remain in close contact to this day. The only real downside is that I ended up, unexpectedly, spending a lot of personal funds to make those interviews happen. (I do realize that I was fortunate to have the financial means to pay Mekana what she expected. Had I not had the means, as some graduate student researchers, for example, might not have had, I would have needed to resolve the situation differently, all the while still recognizing my obligation of fidelity. Perhaps one solution could have involved my labor to help her locate a job.)

In this case, then, fidelity outweighed all other considerations (see Figure 5). If I had not kept my perceived obligation to Mekana—even a promise that I did not explicitly make—all of the other duties I had fulfilled might not have mattered. Mekana might not have cared that I was being beneficent or showing gratitude. I simply would have been viewed as someone who did not follow through on what she had offered and the promise she had made. This feeling may have been even further amplified because of her age, the fact that she was still struggling in the disaster aftermath, and her own economic and social vulnerability.
What would I do differently now to ensure that I do not revisit such a sticky (and costly!) situation in the future? First, I would make my promises, my commitments, more explicit. If I had drawn up even a brief written contract for Mekana, she and I could have looked it over together and have made decisions about what was fair and feasible for both of us. This would have allowed us to discuss the parameters of our work relationship and the research and payment expectations in a transparent manner. Because of the power differential in our relationship, however, I would have to be careful to ensure that Mekana would feel completely free to express her needs and desires. That is, of course, likely easier said than done, but all such actions begin with awareness and thus it is an important issue for researchers to keep in mind.

Figure 5. Moral Factors in Peek's Expectations Example 2.2

Category 3: Reciprocity

Browne’s ethical dilemma: Is disproportionate gift giving acceptable when it is visible to the whole network?
Timeframe in the process of recovery: Four years after the disaster.

3.1.a. Context and experience:

Four years after Katrina, most of the family had moved out of FEMA trailers into newly rebuilt housing where their pre-Katrina homes had been. By this time, most people were ready to put the storm behind them and move on with their lives. But heartache persisted in this phase of “recovery” because relatives had fared so differently in material terms. Some family members had been given enough funds by the Louisiana Road Home
disaster recovery program to rebuild good homes. But a few saw their material lives and financial situations worsen significantly.

My research with the family had continued after the film work ended and the documentary had aired on PBS stations. Too much about life after Katrina remained unresolved, and I (Browne) sensed that the disparities in recovery had caused strain between the family members who had lived so similarly before the storm. I wanted to understand how recovery would unfold in the fullest sense. Once people had gotten into their new homes by summer of 2009, the caprice of unequal compensation from government authorities became clear. The four sisters represented the elders of the group—Katie, Cynthia, Roseana, and Audrey—each with her own children, now grown, and grandchildren. As it turned out, Katie, who was the only sister who had been a central character in the film, got dramatically less compensation for her home than the others, even though the flood insurance she had and the economic situation before Katrina made this an imponderable outcome. She and her husband ended up with only enough funds to buy a double-wide trailer; the other sisters had ended up with appreciably bigger, better homes.

I had worked hard all these years of my research to express my gratitude to Katie and her sisters in equal measure—gift cards, birthday gifts, holiday gifts, gifts upon visiting, surprise gifts. But when the hard reality of final post-disaster compensations became apparent, I wanted to do something more for Katie. After all, she had not only gotten a pitifully small allowance from Road Home, she had also suffered a terrible stroke in December 2007, leaving her without the ability to speak or walk. Until her stroke, Katie had been the most generous person imaginable to me—offering up her homemade food, her ready conversation, and unlimited access to her life and home.

I wanted to give Katie something to show my recognition of the injustice of her housing outcome and to contribute in some small way to her comfort at a time of real mental, physical, and financial strain. I decided to find a way to get Katie a big porch, one her double-wide trailer home had not come with. I would supply the cost of the materials and locate volunteer carpenters to build it. Providing funds out of my pocket was never the dilemma for me. In fact, it was not until after the porch was finished, some nine months later, that I realized the ethical landmine I had stepped on. I never mentioned to anyone that I had organized and financed the project, but Katie’s husband and her children did. And many of her cousins and grandchildren and others in the family thanked me. But I was unprepared for a question from Katie’s sister one afternoon when she asked, “You do this for Katie?” “Well, I helped,” I responded. “Yeah, well, I could use one of them in my back yard,” she said looking at me with hard eyes.
3.1.b. A backward glance with the aid of Ross’ framework:

Making it possible for Katie to enjoy a porch was important to me, but I didn’t have a clear way of thinking through the process I had committed myself to until afterwards, when I revisited the situation in light of Ross’ moral considerations (see Figure 6). It was then that I came to appreciate both what had inspired my large gift, and what other moral factor had intervened to make me question whether I might have acted wrongly. In the first case, I had been moved by the unjust allocation of Road Home awards. Katie had lived in her double-wide trailer home for six months before I realized that no one else was going to help her build a porch, the one thing that I knew could improve her life. So I decided I would. But then, after the porch was finished, a jealous sister said out loud what others may have also felt—“I want one too.” Never mind that she had gotten a nice big front porch on her home. She wanted a back porch, too.

The moral consideration I had risked in my action was “non-maleficence” or “do no harm.” In a way, by privileging Katie’s need, I could have done harm to my own relationship with some of her family members who didn’t admit the inequalities or perhaps didn’t believe they were wrong. More importantly, I could have damaged the relationship between the sisters or other family members because of my choice to favor one individual with a large gift. After all, Katie was the central character in the film and terrible things had happened to her. In this case, I decided that Katie deserved to have a porch, period. I had unconsciously decided that the moral factor of “justice” trumped the “do no harm” consideration.

3.1.c. A forward glance at what I would do differently now:

It might be tempting to consider “do no harm” as the single most important ethical concern we can practice as researchers. But this is a case that argues otherwise. The scale of potential harm was small, especially when compared to the clear benefits of helping someone to whom I owed my fidelity and whose suffering I could alleviate in a modest way, righting to a degree the “injustice” of her situation. Perhaps most importantly, this case demonstrates how complicated the ethical terrain can be when one is researching a group of people who know each other well and whose lives are so tightly intertwined. People learn quickly what you have done for others, what you have revealed about yourself, what information and knowledge you have shared and with whom. In my eight years of experience with this family, the feeling that everyone observes both who I interact with and what I give them has subsided in intensity, but has never really ended.

For this reason, I would proceed differently next time, realizing that it would be naïve for me to imagine that everyone would simply be happy for Katie to have a porch if it had come as a personal gift. Even if others in a network receive a post-disaster material amenity from the government, any decision on my part to “right the wrong” would need
more careful navigation to avoid unnecessary hurt, jealousy, envy, or anger. In the future, I would not attempt to create such a gift without talking through it with others close to the beneficiary. I could instead, for example, initiate an effort to make the gift from everyone, contributing the most but including others in the gift and in the joy of giving Katie something special. My “private” gift could become a public one, reducing the chance it could be seen as overdone or perhaps even proprietary in nature. Using Ross’ framework I could in this way accommodate the competing claims of this situation, both “justice” and “do no harm” (see Figure 6). Instead, I stuck strongly to a single mandate—righting an injustice and in doing so, foreclosed the possibility of handling the situation in a more ethically aware and positive way.

Figure 6. Moral Factors in Browne's Reciprocity Example 3.1

Category 3. Reciprocity

**Peek’s ethical dilemma:** Is disproportionate gift giving acceptable even when it is not visible to others?

**Timeframe in the process of recovery:** Years one through seven after the disaster.

3.2.a. Context and experience:

In addition to my research in Denver with displaced survivors, I (Peek) spent seven years collaborating with Alice Fothergill on a study of children’s post-Katrina recovery. In 2005, we identified and began following a sample of children and their families, attempting to understand the ways that Katrina has served as a “turning point moment” in shaping these young people’s peer and family relationships, schooling outcomes, physical
and mental health, housing and neighborhood circumstances, and overall life outlooks. This study, like the one in Denver, is again differentiated from Browne’s research in that the families we have worked with in Louisiana, save for a few exceptions, do not know one another. Yet, similar to Browne, Fothergill and I have found ourselves in situations of disproportionate gift giving based on perceived need.

The families in our Louisiana study vary significantly in terms of their class backgrounds, ranging from low-income to upper middle class. Although we have always tried to do some things for all families—such as sending all children a card with $5 enclosed on their respective birthdays—we have also found ourselves giving far more to the families most in need. For example, we have taken some of the poorest families in our study grocery shopping and school supply shopping on numerous occasions; we have mailed boxes of clothing, bedding supplies, towels, and other household goods to these families; we financed trips to the laundromat and helped wash and fold laundry; and we have sent cash through the mail and have paid bills for these families on occasion, when they were in particularly dire economic circumstances.

These gifts responded in part to the needs that became evident in the course of interviews and observations of families in temporary homes who lacked access to many basic necessities. By contrast, the middle- and upper-middle class families in our study did not require such gifts.

3.2.b. A backward glance with the aid of Ross’ framework:

When Browne gave disproportionately, she risked alienating or angering members of the extended family network because they knew about the generous gift of the porch that she had given as well as about all the other things she had done for the members of the network. Fothergill and I never had to worry that other families in our study would know what we had done, but we often questioned ourselves about whether it was “fair” for us to do so much for some families, while not offering the same or equivalent gifts to other families. We also talked frequently about whether we were violating our IRB protocol when we would mail off boxes of used clothing or other items that we had not listed as “compensation” in the study, but that we knew the families in our study truly needed.

Concerns about targeted and disproportionate gift giving are genuine. We want to ensure that as we attempt to show gratitude to the families in our study, that we go about this in a just and fair manner. Indeed, in our attempt to make our “acts right,” we have tried to uphold the duties of gratitude, justice, and beneficence. These three moral obligations have driven our decisions about what and how much to give to the families in Louisiana.
3.2.c. A forward glance at what we would do differently now:

This example differs from the other five cases discussed above in that upon reflection, and with the aid of Ross’ framework in mind, I would not change anything about the decisions Fothergill and I have made regarding giving to our participants in Louisiana (see Figure 7). Although we have worried often about our disproportionate gift giving, Ross actually offers us some degree of clarity: we were fulfilling obligations to our participants—to the best of our ability—while avoiding doing harm to other participants. Of course, we would risk doing harm had our participants known one another, but they do not. Thus, what this framework has done for us is to offer some peace of mind about decisions that we have made while in the field.

Figure 7. Moral Factors in Peek’s Reciprocity Example 3.2

Response without ethical tools

Response with ethical toolkit

Part 5. Toward an Ethical Disaster Research Agenda

Post-disaster research is, by definition, urgent and time is always compressed. In our experience, many types of ethical issues arise in long-term field studies similar to those we presented. Research in post-disaster settings also carries a disproportionate amount of emotional freight, and although the range of such emotion may vary in form and intensity over time, it is a predictable factor that shapes data collection and data quality. The characteristics of long-term disaster research make it all the more important that scholars involved in this field prepare for the inevitable difficulties they will face with the aid of an ethical toolkit. We hope that this article helps nurture a richer and more fulfilling ethical conversation in the field of disaster studies.
In our research to understand the human consequences of disaster, we have come to recognize that ethical decision making was not adequately resolved or, in many cases, even anticipated by the IRB. During our respective data collection and other on-the-ground experiences, we both regularly confronted complex and sensitive problems in need of reflexive reasoning. Rather than ignoring these issues or handling them quietly using our best instincts, we were motivated by our ethical concerns to find a more satisfying, systematic way to approach these issues.

The first step in developing an ethical toolkit and making better decisions is to develop an *active awareness* about the moments in which such ethical challenges may become apparent. For us, those moments emerged most often in response to shifting levels of vulnerability among our participants, unclear or mismatched expectations, and questions surrounding appropriate ways to reciprocate while in the field. To accept and live up to our responsibilities to ourselves as researchers and human beings and to our participants, we have found it helpful to engage with ideas that do not pre-determine ethical decisions, but that instead allow the context of our dilemma to guide us to an appropriate solution.

The context-rich system of ideas we have introduced in this article emerges from the philosophical work of a moral pluralist, W.D. Ross. The point, however, is not to enshrine Ross’ schema so much as to recognize how a pluralist conception of moral duty rooted in the considerations of *fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement*, and *non-maleficence* can offer us the most flexibility and the most space for our own insights.

Using Ross, we offer a toolkit that can help us think by reminding us of what counts, and by helping us to reflect more carefully about the context of the situation and the choices we have available to us. Ross asks us to first consider the list of irreducible ethical considerations, then to identify those that are operating in the context of interest, and finally, to decide which of those salient moral considerations we will honor as the most important in that case. Whatever choices we make engage our judgment and impact our participants and our insights. These considerations cannot neatly be codified under a single root factor (e.g., utilitarianism) nor a pre-determined path for deciding what is morally right (e.g., Kantian ethics); instead, Ross’ ideas provide a palette that requires our individual judgment and reflection as morally sensitive beings. Through this pluralist approach, we can make and, at the same time, keep charge of our moral decisions. Such a framework places the burden on us as individuals to pay attention, to consider the needs and interests of those around us, and to develop awareness of our words and actions and the sociocultural context in which we work.

Our ethical toolkit will not make dilemmas disappear, of course. Instead, the toolkit we propose can help sharpen critical awareness and help us recognize when there are competing moral considerations at play. Ultimately, the toolkit can help us make *better*
decisions that align more clearly with our values and make room for the respect we intend to show all parties involved in ethnographic research.

Notes

1. See, for example, the Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics and Science and Engineering Ethics.
2. See, for example, Campbell, 2010.
3. In fact, IRBs may examine questions researchers plan to ask after a disaster with “unusual scrutiny” (Benight & McFarlane 2007, p. 422), even though this additional scrutiny may not be warranted (DePrince & Chu 2008; Newman et al. 2006).
4. “Deviations” are defined as any departure from the procedures identified in the institutionally-approved final research protocol. Although often unplanned and unintentional, such deviations may place participants at risk and undermine the scientific integrity of the study and are thus subject to formal IRB protocol deviation reporting requirements.
5. The documentary film produced by Browne and Martin, Still Waiting: Life After Katrina, tracks dozens of family members from St. Bernard Parish outside the city of New Orleans for nearly two years. Still Waiting aired on Public Broadcast Station (PBS) channels across the country in August 2007 and again at the five-year anniversary in 2010. Browne’s research with the large family spanned an additional five years, involving regular visits to family members at their homes on the bayou for subsequent interviews and ethnographic observation and participation. Her research concluded soon after the seven-year anniversary in September 2012. This long-term research is the subject of a book in progress, focused on the cultural dimensions of loss and recovery (see Browne 2013).
6. Peek’s research with Katrina survivors in Denver occurred from October 2005-August 2008. In this study, she and her students interviewed African American and white parents and their children, focusing on the nature of adjustment within these displaced households (Peek 2012; Peek et al. 2011), the specific resource needs of single mothers (Tobin-Gurley et al. 2010), and the experiences of children and youth in Denver schools (Peek & Richardson 2010). Peek’s second project, a collaborative long-term study with Alice Fothergill which spanned the seven years following Katrina, involved a series of observations and interviews with children and youth, their family members, teachers, and other caregivers (Fothergill & Peek 2006; 2012; Peek & Fothergill 2008). This work is the subject of a book which traces the divergent post-Katrina recovery trajectories of children (Fothergill & Peek forthcoming).
7. Together, the public outrage concerning the treatment of innocent people in these and other research studies led to the generation of ethical standards by which researchers must comply. For useful overviews of the ethical problems in research that have led to increasingly articulated ethical codes (see Fluehr-Lobban 2003; Rollin 2010).
8. The most recent revision of the Professional Code of Ethics in Anthropology was published in 2012. Since the first code was adopted by the American Anthropological Association in 1971, the code has been revised several times. Since the first Code of Ethics was adopted by the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1970, it has
undergone two major revisions in 1984 and 1997. This most recent version of the
ASA code represented a substantial revision, largely in response to increased concern
with ethical misconduct among professional societies and government agencies
during the mid-1990s (Iucovich et al. 2003).

9. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (1974-1978) studied the issues and authored the report. Then,
through the early 1980s, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
revised this report to expand protections for human subjects.


11. In philosophy, there are three primary fields of ethics: metaethics, normative ethics,
and applied ethics (see LaFollette 2000: 1-13). Metaethics is devoted to exploring
the very nature of ethical facts and thought. Normative ethics concerns the way ethical
frameworks are understood in relation to actual human behavior (unlike “descriptive
ethics” that simply describe different moral beliefs). Normative ethics includes
constructs like utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and any other formulation
to guide moral action. Applied ethics focuses ethical questions on a given domain of
activity (business ethics, medical ethics, etc.). Our article engages normative ethical
constructs with an applied ethical mission to improve ethical awareness in the course
of disaster research.

12. For a contemporary treatment of utilitarian thought, see: Brink 2006; Hooker 2000;
Scare 1996. For similar work about Kantian thought, see: Guyer 2007; Wood 2007.

13. Mill disagreed with Bentham’s idea that the key outcome was the greatest pleasure
for the greatest number. Instead, he proposed that the greatest good involved a
hierarchy of types of good, and that not all good was equally valuable as an outcome
(see Mill 1863).

14. The best known formula of the Categorical Imperative is known as the “universal law
of nature” and states that whatever action one might choose can only be “right” if
everyone everywhere could make the same choice without altering (contradicting) the
moral law. For example, if we decide to break a promise, we would have to first will
that everyone everywhere also break their promises. If that happened, there would be
no such thing as a promise. Hence, the very notion of a promise would be
contradicted by our act, thus making it clearly wrong. For a summary discussion of
this concept, see Hill 2000; 2006.

15. The complexity of the Categorical Imperative has attracted a cadre of philosophical
scholars who have pursued its study for their entire careers.

16. For a discussion of the moral premise of capitalist economies, see Browne 2009.

17. One of the most important utilitarian thinkers since Mill is G.E. Moore (2011 [1912]).

18. Ross’ argument in this regard resembles Aristotle’s in the Nicomachean Ethics, in
which he states that we are required to use “practical reason” to figure out what is
right.

19. Some recent ethical thinkers have considered Ross’ own discomfort with the term
“prima facie” that he describes in relation to moral obligations that present
themselves in any given situation and relabeled this term “pro tanto” to better suit the
logic of Ross’ intention (McNaughton 1999: 273). This term indicates that a given
action may be right in itself, but other considerations have not yet determined whether, in this instance, it is in fact the right choice.

20. Mauss (1990 [1925]) explained that in small-scale societies, gift giving keeps goods and services circulating, obligating people to each other in ways that build trust and social cohesion. Reciprocal gift giving serves similar trust-building functions among individuals in market-based societies like the United States. For a discussion of how morality interacts with systems of reciprocity in different types of societies, see Browne 2009.

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